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Abstract: The purpose of our study is to explore the social construction of authority in disaster relief 
coordination. We emphasize the ways in which stakeholders draw upon various discursive resources in 
order to establish or preserve their authority to act within a certain problem domain. We review 
literature on authority, coordination, communication, and collaborative work to provide a theoretical 
framework that informs our empirical examples. Next we present a case study of disaster relief 
coordination in the Philippines following Typhoon Yolanda (known internationally as Haiyan). Our case 
focuses on home reconstruction in the Cebu province of the Central Visayas region of the Philippines, 
one of the areas hardest hit by the storm where most of the homes were destroyed or severely damaged. 
This case demonstrates organizations do not have authority within this problem domain, but instead 
construct authority through practice and sensemaking in order to accomplish a variety of individual and 
collective goals; authority is in a constant state of negotiation as various organizations coordinate with 
each other (or not) to provide effective disaster relief. We conclude with a discussion about the 
contributions and implications of our research. 
Introduction 
Disaster relief work in developing nations entails a tremendous human effort to rebuild affected 
communities and reestablish order. Multiple parties are needed to address the vast amount of needs that 
arise in disaster situations, including healthcare, sanitation, food, shelter, and infrastructure. No single 
entity has the capacity or power to handle all these needs on their own, so effective relief work often 
involves some level of collaboration and coordination among government agencies and nongovernmental 
organizations, professional and volunteer aid workers, public and private donors, as well as local 
populations and municipal representatives. Consequently, large-scale disasters are usually managed by a 
central agency like the United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) whose 
mission is, in part, to “mobilize and coordinate effective and principled humanitarian action with national 
and international actors.” Their goal is to develop a framework for each actor to contribute to the overall 
response effort, thus ensuring at least the perception of cooperation and partnership among the relevant 
parties. 
However, the mere presence of a central agency such as UNOCHA is rarely sufficient to achieve 
coordination, and despite the discourse of coordination that is common in disaster planning and response 
(see Clarke, Chess, Holmes, & O’Neill, 2006) things are always more complicated in the field. Even with 
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their common goals of relief and restoration, the multiple parties involved often have different ways of 
operating, varied goals and motivations, and sometimes even competing interests and strategies. 
Furthermore, UNOCHA does not have formal authority over many of the other organizations and 
constituents involved, nor do they always have the authority to take action on certain initiatives and 
projects in affected regions. Despite the presumption or appearance of a controlled response orchestrated 
by a central agency, the coordination of disaster relief involves complicated arrangements of power, 
expertise, jurisdiction, and capacity that are continually in flux and require the ongoing consent of the 
parties involved. Thus establishing authority is a central problem for disaster relief coordination, which is 
a key challenge for collaborative work more broadly. Yet in this context the issue is not merely asserting 
the authority one has, but rather continually constructing some notion of authority that is accepted by 
others as legitimate. How this can happen and what it can look like are the foci of the present study. 
Like other forms of collaborative work, effective disaster relief entails establishing a legitimate form of 
authority capable of coordinating the diverse interests of multiple stakeholders, but apart from hierarchical 
mechanisms of control (Lawrence, Hardy, & Phillips, 2002). Management and organizational studies 
traditionally have depicted authority as an objective feature of bureaucratic relations that is exercised 
through administrative power and control (Kuhn, 2008). But the complexity of collaborative work makes 
it increasingly difficult to predict and control who is responsible for accomplishing various tasks (Kahn & 
Kram, 1994). Collaboration also obscures the boundaries among partners and creates ambiguous 
authority relations that are difficult to reconcile (Koschmann, 2013). Instead of conceptualizing authority 
as a formal position in a hierarchy, collaboration pushes us to understand authority as a distributed 
phenomenon that is worked out in practice as stakeholders negotiate the meanings and interpretations of 
their work. Authority is thus a social accomplishment that is achieved and sustained in communication, 
subject to continual revision depending on how people interact with each other, and thus shifts in the very 
communication intended by those to define and exercise authority. Therefore, a key issue for disaster 
relief work is understanding how various groups and organizations develop and maintain the authority 
perceived as necessary for successful coordination in a particular context, especially since authority is 
what gives coordination its semantic positioning and consequentiality in the first place. 
Accordingly, the purpose of our study is to explore the social construction of authority in disaster relief 
coordination. In particular, we emphasize the ways in which stakeholders draw upon various discursive 
resources in order to establish or preserve their authority to act within a certain problem domain. We 
begin by reviewing relevant literature on authority, coordination, communication, and collaborative work, 
which provides a theoretical framework to inform our empirical examples. Next we present a case study 
of disaster relief coordination in the Philippines following Typhoon Yolanda (known internationally as 
Haiyan), a catastrophic storm that killed over six thousand people and devastated much of the physical 
infrastructure throughout the island nation, thus requiring a substantial relief effort among dozens of 
agencies and organizations. Our case focuses on home reconstruction in the Cebu province of the Central 
Visayas region of the Philippines, one of the areas hardest hit by the storm, where most of the homes 
were destroyed or severely damaged. This case demonstrates organizations do not have authority within 
this problem domain, but instead construct authority through practice and sensemaking in order to 
accomplish a variety of individual and collective goals; authority is in a constant state of negotiation as 
various organizations coordinate with each other (or not) to provide effective disaster relief. We conclude 
with a discussion about the contributions and implications of our research. 
Literature Review and Research Questions 
Although our literature review is sequenced first in this article, our examination of previous research was 
concurrent and reflexive with our empirical investigation. This process of “theoretically-informed 
induction” (Tracy, 2007) ensured that our conceptual framework was guided by our empirical 
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observations and vice versa. Our study began with the opportunity to explore general issues of 
coordination among the relief work associated with Typhoon Yolanda in the Cebu region, which we 
describe later in our research methods section. We followed the principles of inductive, practice-based 
research (Craig & Tracy, 1995) to identify practical issues that people were facing and see what specific 
topics would emerge to guide a more targeted investigation. After several months of observations and 
interviews with key informants we identified authority as a central issue that warranted further analysis—
some aspect of authority seemed to be at issue in many of the meetings and interactions we observed, as 
well as a notable topic of conversation in our discussions with various relief workers. We began reviewing 
communication and collaboration literature on authority to better inform our subsequent fieldwork and 
data analysis. 
Problematizing Coordination and Authority in Collaborative Work 
Collaboration is a hallmark of contemporary organizing. The complexity, uncertainty, and interdependency 
of work makes some form of collaborative work necessary for successful outcomes across many industries 
and sectors, and presents unique opportunities for innovation and creative problem solving (Faraj & Xiao, 
2006). Organizational collaboration has thus received substantial attention from scholars in many fields 
including management (Hardy, Lawrence, & Grant, 2005), organizational studies (Majchrzak, More, & Faraj, 
2012), behavioral science (Wood and Gray, 1991), communication (Lewis, 2006), planning, (Innes & 
Booher, 2010), nonprofit studies (Austin & Seitanidi, 2012), and public policy (Rosenau, 2000). Although 
collaboration may involve highly integrative, transformative relationships among organizations, many 
organizational collaborations are characterized by transactional relationships that simply entail a sufficient 
level of coordination among stakeholders in order to achieve some higher-order collaborative goal(s) that 
could not be accomplished individually. Coordination generally entails a minimal level of cooperation in 
terms of information sharing and task alignment, though distinct from formal collaborative arrangements 
that are characterized by more integrative relationships (Austin, 2000). 
Such is the case with disaster relief work, where effective responses are presumed to necessitate 
coordination among multiple agencies and organizations in order to achieve more comprehensive 
provision and reduce service redundancies (Nolte, Martin, & Boenigk, 2012). Coordination is clearly the 
ideal in disaster relief and humanitarian work, where successful projects are often defined in terms of their 
level of coordination, and the lack of coordination is frequently cited as the central problem in failed 
efforts (see Balcik et al., 2010; Benini, 1998; Drabek, 2007; Jahre & Jensen, 2010; Rey, 2001). Even with 
continuing challenges and numerous examples of unsuccessful initiatives, coordination continues to receive 
increased attention and support, especially due to the scarcity of global resources, issues of accountability, 
and advances in information communication technologies (Lindenberg & Bryant, 2001). The significance of 
coordination was further bolstered through the United Nations humanitarian reform agenda that 
introduced the “cluster approach’”—a new system that organizes relief agencies into eleven different 
essential service areas (e.g., shelter, health, nutrition), which is now the norm for international disaster 
and humanitarian relief work. 
Yet despite being taken for granted as essential in the disaster response community and scholarly 
literature, the notion of coordination is also problematic. Coordination has been critiqued as a “shell 
term” (Smith, 2005) that does not function descriptively but remains to be filled by those have power to 
give and sustain its meaning (see Bartesaghi, 2014), and identified as one of the three c-shibboleth terms 
of disaster planning and response (along with communication and cooperation, see Clarke, 1999; Clarke 
et al., 2006). Coordination’s emptiness can be seen in its tautological relationship with successful disaster 
response, where it is claimed that coordination is necessary for successful response and recovery, and 
success is defined in terms of coordinated efforts. Thus Bartesaghi (2014) concludes that coordination is 
a key term in the “metadiscursive vocabulary of disaster”—well-formed bureaucratic language that 
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reflexively organizes social relations in ways that legitimate the very conditions of its use. With all this in 
mind, our challenge in the present study is to recognize that coordination is both given and problematic, 
taken for granted in disaster contexts but also exposed as troublesome under further scrutiny. 
In this context a key issue is constructing and maintaining a sufficient level of authority in order to work 
as a legitimate actor in a given problem domain. Even in collaboration—which tends to be more 
decentralized and egalitarian than other conventional forms of organizing—some level of authority is still 
necessary to ensure perceptions of legitimacy and accountability (Okhuysen & Bechky, 2009; Taylor & Van 
Every, 2011), and to reconcile the knowledge differences, power asymmetries, and other “jurisdictional 
conflicts” (Kellogg, Orlikowski, & Yates, 2006) that are characteristic of collaborative work.  The 
challenge, however, is that this type of coordination involves interorganizational relationships that are 
negotiated through ongoing communicative process that do not depend on market or hierarchical 
mechanisms of control (Lawrence et al., 2002)—compliance cannot be bought or imposed. Therefore 
authority is not a rational-legal or legitimate form of power that is derived from one’s position in a 
bureaucracy, as assumed in the early work of Fayol (1916/1949),  Weber (1922/1968), and Barnard (1938). 
For collaboration and coordination, authority is not something people “have” by virtue of their place 
within an organizational structure, but rather a negotiated phenomenon that is distributed among various 
stakeholders. This approach to authority emphasizes more emergent forms of legitimacy, accountability, 
and influence that surpass hierarchies and boundaries (Kahn & Kram, 1994; Okhuysen & Bechky, 2009). 
Authority is worked out in practice as people engage with each other and make sense of their interactions, 
lending consent (or not) regarding the scope of their power over each other and the various tasks they 
are involved with—what Bartesaghi (2009, p. 16) calls a “discursive co-construction.” But how can local 
and situated interactions can give rise to broader systems of authority and legitimacy that can transcend 
space and time in order to coordinate work across domains of knowledge and expertise? If authority is 
not imposed from the “top” or exercised as an objective feature of hierarchical relations, how is it formed 
and maintained in practice, and how do people make sense of these social constructions? To address these 
questions we turn to previous literature on communicative constitution, practice theory, and sensemaking 
to enhance our understanding of authority in disaster relief coordination. 
Practice, Sensemaking, and the Communicative Constitution of Authority 
Within the field of organizational communication, scholars aligned with the Montréal School 
(see Brummans et al., 2014) have done the most extensive work to theorize authority as a negotiated and 
distributed phenomenon that is grounded in practice (see Benoit-Barné & Cooren, 2009; Brummans et 
al., 2013; Cooren, 2010; Kuhn, 2008; Taylor & Van Every, 2011; Taylor & Van Every, 2014). This research 
portrays authority as a process of authoring where people struggle to “write” an official version of their 
work that conveys particular notions of purpose, direction, and identity. This approach to authority relates 
to the textual existence or “modality” of organizations, where interrelated networks of meaning are 
“read” in certain ways to enable coordination (Kärreman, 2001; Westwood & Linstead, 2001). In this 
regard texts can be either concrete (tangible signs and symbols with a fairly permanent existence) or 
figurative (more abstract depictions of organizing) (Kuhn, 2008). Whether concrete or figurative, a textual 
approach helps explain why people often refer to coordination as being “on the same page,” even if not 
referring to a specific document or policy. 
Furthermore, texts are not inherently authoritative but instead can develop authority through the 
processes by which they were authored. For this to happen, local interactions must “scale up” (Cooren 
& Fairhurst, 2009) and gain distance from their immediate circumstances, a process known as “distancing” 
(or distanciation, à la Ricoeur, 1991). The result is more than just a loose collection of texts, but rather an 
organizational abstraction taken to legitimate all the interactions this abstraction refers to (Taylor, 
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Cooren, Giroux, & Robichaud, 1996). As they gain distance from their original contexts, the textual 
outcomes of interaction become more ambiguous and abstract and tend to discard evidence of any 
particular authorship. This means that the contributions and intentions of specific people are ignored or 
excluded, and all that remains is an abstraction that becomes the focus of subsequent interactions. Thus 
for texts to become authoritative they must shed evidence of individual authorship and instead depict a 
collective accomplishment (even unintentionally) that is accepted as legitimate, credible, and even 
commanding. This “vanishing” (Taylor & Van Every, 2011) of individual authorship enables textual 
abstractions to develop authority. Authority is now attributed to the abstraction itself instead of any 
specific individual, collective action can now be taken in the name of this abstraction, and agency can even 
ascribed to this abstraction. Authority is not in a hierarchical position nor in a person who gives 
commands, but rather in the process of author-ing the legitimate representation of the collective—
authority is a shared recognition about a unitary source of agency that can coordinate activities and 
subordinate divergent interests. All of this comes together when authority is made present 
(“presentification,” Cooren, 2006, 2010) in interaction as people invoke various organizational texts and 
other discursive resources as sources of agency to justify certain actions or decisions, both in their 
immediate practices and their retrospective sensemaking. 
The key point is that authority is relational because it emerges from interactive circumstances and can only 
be understood in reference to the actions of others. Thus many scholars approach these issues from the 
perspective of practice. That is, authority is seen as emerging from ongoing streams of recurrent, everyday 
activities, rather than objective features of an organizational context or structural arrangement. Although 
there is no unified theory of practice (Schatzki, 2006), a principal tenet of a practice perspective is that 
social life is an ongoing construction and emerges through people’s continuing actions (Feldman & 
Orlikowski, 2011). Practices do not merely describe what people do, but instead are central activities for 
meaning production and identity formation (Nicolini, 2009). Taking a practice approach to authority and 
coordination means focusing on the relationship between specific occasions of situated action and the 
broader social context in which those actions take place (Feldman & Orlikowski, 2011). Coordination 
authority is thus a nexus of interconnected practices that constitute a “site” (Nicolini, 2011) of cross-
domain knowledge and expertise. 
Additionally, the meaning of these practices is not always evident or realized in the moment, but rather 
constructed retrospectively as participants make sense of their interactions. The relationship between 
practice and sensemaking is then an iterative one wherein the ongoing stream of actions that make up 
practice are punctuated and informed by periods of sensemaking. Sensemaking here quite literally 
describes the process wherein individuals or groups of individuals work to make sense of previous 
interactions, problems, explanations, and situations (Weick, 1995). This is not necessarily a cognitive 
process, but an interactive process where people take part in (re)constituting understandings of their 
environment. As Taylor and Robichaud (2004) have explained, sensemaking is pivotal for the construction 
of texts—within the text/conversation dialectic (Taylor & Van Every, 2000)—in that sensemaking “invokes 
language as members call forth knowledge of previous events through recollections and understandings of 
an appropriate response, given the situation” (p. 397). Conceiving of this relationship in this way then 
positions sensemaking as a component of the overall construction of authority within various sites. Thus, 
within the text/conversation dialectic, it is fruitful to think about the construction of texts as sensemaking 
and conversation within the ongoing stream of action that is practice. 
Furthermore, if practice and sensemaking are sites of knowing (Nicolini, 2011), then different occupational 
communities have unique knowledge bases that are different from others who are not involved in their 
practice or sensemaking processes, making the mere transfer of information inadequate for successful 
coordination. Instead, coordination difficulties are more about language differences and alternative 
conceptualizations of work (Bechky, 2003), what Dougherty (1992) calls “interpretive problems.” 
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Consequently, a key task of coordination is reconciling these interpretive differences and integrating 
diverse understandings in ways that foster cooperation (Kellogg, Orlikowski, & Yates, 2006; Majchrzak, 
Moore, & Faraj, 2012). 
Thus our conceptual framework combines research on coordination, practice, sensemaking, and 
communicative constitution to help explain authority in collaborative work. An important next step, 
however, is to examine the actual work of disaster relief coordination and the people involved in 
humanitarian efforts to understand how they practice and make sense of authority. We need to see what 
authority in disaster relief coordination actually entails, and we need more accounts from humanitarian 
personnel that demonstrate how they make sense of authority in their work. Therefore we turn to a case 
study of coordination and authority in the Philippines following typhoon Yolanda in 2013. Our goal is to 
offer several empirical examples that illustrate our conceptual framework and provide anchor points for 
subsequent research. The following research questions guided our investigation: Within the context of 
disaster relief coordination, what textual or discursive resources do people and organizations draw upon 
to convey authority? How do these people make sense of their authority in their work? How do people 
authorize themselves in relation to other stakeholders, especially when their authority may be in question? 
How do people make forms of authority present in their interactions, and with what effect? 
Method 
This study is part of a larger project investigating post-disaster reconstruction processes in the Philippines 
after Typhoon Yolanda in 2013[1]. This three-year project follows twenty reconstruction sites across the 
island nation to identify the various processes associated with resilient and sustainable infrastructure 
systems. The present study focuses on the Cebu province of the Central Visayas region of the Philippines. 
This area was in the direct path of the typhoon and experienced substantial destruction. Consequently, 
numerous humanitarian organizations and agencies converged in the area to provide relief. Though loosely 
organized through the United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), the 
various organizations and agencies coordinated much of the work on their own. Our study focuses 
specifically on housing reconstruction projects in the area and the ways in which these stakeholders 
practiced and understood authority. Table 1 explains several key terms and acronyms that are used 
throughout our analysis. 
Research Site 
In the present study we examined reconstruction activities on Bantayan Island in the province of Cebu 
following Yolanda. The typhoon crippled a number of island provinces, but Cebu was unique in that the 
damage was concentrated in northern regions that were relatively isolated from the developed central 
urban areas. As such, aid organizations were forced into closer proximity in contrast to other regions that 
were impacted by the storm. Banatayan Island in particular is an interesting site because of its small size 
and limited connectivity; the island only has one port of entry about an hour from mainland Cebu. The 
resulting geographic remoteness and large presence of aid organizations led to authority-related struggles, 
ranging from design standards to operating locations. This jockeying for legitimacy and power led to our 
selection and examination of authority in the region. Despite these unique features, the island context is 
also comparable to other regions studied after Yolanda which will allow for future comparison on the 
practice of authority. 
A key part of our research site was the “shelter cluster” that operated in Cebu province. A shelter cluster 
is one part of the larger cluster system created by the United Nations Office for Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) in 2006 to deal with coordination issues revolving around humanitarian 
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aid. Clusters are groups of humanitarian organizations (both UN and non-UN) working in the primary 
areas of humanitarian aid, such as shelter and healthcare. UNOCHA explains that clusters are created 
when humanitarian needs exist within a particular area, when there are many actors within that area, and 
when national authorities need coordination support. “Clusters provide a clear point of contact and are 
accountable for adequate and appropriate humanitarian assistance. Clusters create partnerships between 
international humanitarian actors, national and local authorities, and civil society” 
(UNOCHA: http://www.unocha.org/what-we-do/coordination-tools/cluster-coordination). The shelter 
cluster operating within the Bantayan region of Cebu was put in place to act as a central hub for all NGO 
activity within the area. 
Data Collection 
Data for this study came from two primary sources: field observations of coordination meetings and 
building sites, as well as in-depth interviews with taskforce NGO workers, government officials, and local 
community members. The third author travelled to the Philippines on two different occasions, which 
included four months of fieldwork approximately six months after the typhoon and again for three months 
approximately one year later. The majority of these visits focused on the identification of sites to track 
longitudinally (for our broader project) with a focus on collecting background data on NGO operations, 
including geographic selection, program objectives, target beneficiaries and early challenges. Observations 
of coordination meetings, inter-organizational meetings, informal communication, and on-site construction 
were documented through extensive field notes. In total, more than 240 hours of these interactions were 
observed over the course of the two field visits. For meetings, the researcher was seated in such a position 
to visualize the entire room of participants, capturing nuanced reactions in the audience. Observations 
within communities included both NGO accompanied and non-accompanied visits in order to capture 
sentiments with and without the presence of project partners. 
Additionally, an initial 32 semi-structured interviews were conducted with primary NGO and government 
officials during the first visit. Questions focused on understanding how organizations were coordinating, 
asking questions such as “How does your organization coordinate across sectors?” On the second field 
visit an additional 167 semi-structured interviews were collected, primarily with community members. 
Further questions were also asked of NGOs and government agencies during this period. Questions 
focused on the role of community members in coordination and the evolution of NGO relations, such as 
“In recent months how has coordination changed?” Interviews were conducted in private locations such 
as NGO offices or community members’ homes and the use of a local translator was provided when a 
participant preferred to speak in Waray or Bisaya, the two most common local languages. For this paper 
we examined 67 of the interviewed collected from the Bantayan Island in the province of Cebu, totaling 
590 single spaced pages of transcription. 
The large amount of interview data within this project is viewed as a strength in that it allowed us to trace 
how participants were making sense of their environment over the course of time. Interviews with the 
same organizational members were often conducted more than once at different points in the 
development process. Important to our interview procedures was acknowledging the ways in which 
interviews provided the time and space for participants to reflect upon and make sense of their 
involvement in various reconstruction efforts. As Way, Zwier, and Tracy (2015) explained, if we take the 
ideas of communicative constitution seriously, then “it makes sense to treat interviews as opportunities 
for meaning making and transformation” (p. 2). Thus, as foreshadowed in our literature review, interviews 
served as moments of sensemaking that are inevitably informed by previous practices and then reflexively 
inform subsequent practices. 
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Data Analysis 
Because of the considerable amount of data we have and the extensive amount of activity involved with 
the relief work in Cebu province, our case study does not focus in depth on any specific event or 
interaction. Instead, our goal here is to tell a broader story of authority and humanitarian coordination 
involving several projects and stakeholders over a longer period of time (see Browning, Beyer, & Shetler, 
1995, as an exemplar of this approach). This is also consistent with other constitutive communication 
research that uses more longitudinal, case-based approaches that trace communicative constitution over 
time through extended observations and interviews (e.g., Blundell, 2007; Güney, 2006, Koschmann, 
2013; Koschmann & Burk, 2016), which complements other work focused solely on more narrow 
conversational episodes. We moved towards a narrative approach through a series of analytical processes. 
First, interviews were read and coded for common themes. Through an iterative process of looking across 
the coded data and relevant scholarship, three key themes emerged as we interpreted the data. These 
processes are described in more depth below. 
We began data analysis by reading through and identifying key themes in the data based on their 
forcefulness, recurrence, and repetition (Owen, 1984). The initial coding process was conducted within 
the software program NVivo (http://www.qsrinternational.com/product), which aided in understanding 
the prevalence of each theme. As key themes began to emerge, we continued to reread interview 
transcripts and typed field notes in a manner consistent with the constant comparison method (Strauss & 
Corbin, 1994). The second author conducted this preliminary data analysis and worked with other authors 
to confirm and validate the interpretations of each theme. Throughout this process, authority emerged as 
a key construct within this problem domain and shaped our interpretive framework moving forward. Data 
were then reread, coded, and interpreted with our attention directed specifically towards different themes 
surrounding authority. Within this coding process, authority was recognized as the various ways that 
participants explained—and demonstrated through our observations—their ability to act, make decisions, 
and marshal consent from other organizational actors. 
We present the results of our study as a case study that highlights three analytic themes surrounding 
authority that emerged from our data. Our case emphasizes one organization in particular, Young Pioneer 
Disaster Response (YPDR; see http://ypdr.org/ [2]), an upstart NGO that struggled to gain and exercise 
authority in a system of more established organizations and agencies. Each theme draws from various 
incidents and interactions that occurred over the course of a year and a half period. Thus, although each 
theme highlights a particular way that authority was practiced and understood within the region, the 
themes intersect and overlap to demonstrate the complex notion of authority in this disaster relief 
context. 
Findings: A Case Study of Constructing Authority  
in Disaster Relief Coordination 
We present our findings as a case study that demonstrates how authority was practiced and understood 
by various stakeholders working in humanitarian relief. This case poses an interesting example of the 
complexity of authority because a variety of organizations are working towards a similar goal in a non-
hierarchical system that requires individual organizations and collectivities of organizational actors to 
construct and maintain (not simply “have”) authority in order to legitimate their work and achieve their 
goals. Thus, what follows are three interconnected themes that emerged from the data and are 
reconstructed here to explain how authority can be practiced and understood in varying—and sometimes 
contradicting—ways within a disaster relief context. First, authority is traced in relation to a single 
organization to demonstrate how their constructions change over time and by circumstance. Next, we 
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discuss “shelter cluster meetings” as authoritative and how authority is practiced and understood in 
contradictory ways. Then, we discuss how donors are constructed as authoritative while NGO leaders 
and Local Government Unit (LGU) officials make donors present in decision-making activities. We 
conclude this section by summarizing and piecing together how each of these themes functioned 
simultaneously within this isolated geographic region. 
Theme 1: Shifting (Discursive) Constructions of Authority 
Within the local area of Bantayan Island in the Cebu province over 40 different national and international 
NGOs operated for varying lengths of time in response to Typhoon Yolanda. One of the key challenges 
was how individual organizations developed the necessary authority, legitimacy, and credibility to act 
within the region. In the midst of local government, national government, and United Nations constraints, 
individual organizations must carve out a particular frame within which they are able to work. 
Unsurprisingly, authority was not marshaled the same ways by each individual organization. Some 
organizations explained their ability and need to act in relation to donor requirements, others explained 
their organization’s actions in terms of particular local government charges, while still others explained 
their authority in light of their organization’s international stature as an aid organization. This 
demonstrates how authority is not a monolithic concept or attribute that organizations simply “have,” but 
rather that organizations draw on different discursive resources to mobilize particular notions of authority 
at different times in order to legitimate their actions within a problem domain. 
For example, take the story of Young Pioneer Disaster Response (YPDR), an organization created for the 
very purpose of responding to the aftermath of Yolanda. Two American friends had finished working and 
vacationing in Asia as Yolanda struck the shores of the Philippines. The pair decided they wanted to invite 
a few volunteers and raise funds to travel to the Philippines and help rebuild a few schools in the Cebu 
region. Across the 68 interviews and field notes conducted within this region, participants routinely 
discussed YPDR in both positive and negative ways—they had a notable presence in the Cebu relief efforts. 
YPDR arrived on Bantayan Island shortly after Yolanda struck and following the construction of several 
school classrooms, partnered with an aid organization called Polish Humanitarian Action to utilize their 
supplies and funding to begin shelter construction. It is here that we pick up the story of YPDR to 
demonstrate how their practice and understanding of authority shifted and evolved over time within the 
region. 
In both meetings and interviews the YPDR founders often talked about what they perceived as the benefits 
and constraints of being a new and unknown entity at the start of the disaster relief process. Instead of 
functioning from a broad plan that is put in place prior to arriving on site, the founders said they decided 
to get involved as quickly as possible with whomever was willing to work with them. However, one of the 
founders claimed that it was hard for big organizations to work together unless the leaders of the 
organization agreed to terms in advance: 
If UNICEF and Oxfam meet on the island to get the project together, it’s very difficult. We didn’t 
have the same constraints but it was still very hard for us to get projects. We met with people 
who would have loved for us to get more things to do but there are so many barriers and 
challenges in doing that. 
YPDR representatives said that initially this issue was quite frustrating for them because they were not 
seen as a legitimate aid organization. Also note the multiple uses of first-person plural pronouns employed 
by this YPDR member (we, us), thereby constructing them as a legitimate actor and distinguishing them 
from other organizations. In the months following their initial attempts to work with existing organizations, 
YPDR claimed to forge their own path and appeared to take pride in their minimalist approach to aid 
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work (even to the dismay of other more established workers in the area). As the founders explained, at 
the start they were committed to sleeping in tents near the work site to ensure that they were not (in 
their minds) wasting money and resources on expensive hotel rooms. This type of pride encouraged 
YPDR to function in particular ways as they began their housing construction processes. Moreover, the 
YPDR founders described shelter cluster meetings and other large-scale coordination efforts as a waste 
of time. In phase one of their shelter construction, other organizations and local government officials 
talked about the poor quality of buildings that were being produced by YPDR and that were contrary to 
shelter cluster standards. The founders claimed this was intentional as this was only phase one and they 
were providing temporary shelter to be improved upon later. 
As YPDR’s relief projects grew in scope, tensions between them, other NGOs, and LGUs began to rise 
as well. Bantayan Island is split into three different municipalities with different mayors and LGU services. 
It is important to note here that Bantayan Island is not much bigger than 40 square miles. Between the 
different mayors and local barangay captains (lowest elected officials), some approved of YPDR’s methods, 
while others refused to work with them. Most specifically, YPDR was eventually not included in one LGU’s 
committee meetings due to perceived insubordination. The following excerpt from an interview with the 
two founders clarifies this point from their perspective: 
YPDR 1: We were told the problem with YPDR is that we do not know how to submit to 
authority as a nongovernmental organization. . .that we are not submitting to the government. 
YPDR 2: Although they forget we are servants of the people not the masters. 
YPDR 1: Yeah not the other way around. 
YPDR 2: We are having a really good relationship with the people. 
Notice how they draw upon notions of “the people” and create opposition towards “the government” as 
ways to position themselves as champions of affected populations. They also construct a notion of 
authority that, somewhat ironically, is based on their insubordination to established forms of authority. 
That is, they frame their legitimacy in terms of their lack of cooperation with the government, which may 
bolster their credibility with the affected populations they are working with. As they make sense of this 
situation they are actively constructing a sense of authority based on service and relationships, not 
domination (mastering). Throughout the early interviews, the YPDR founders regularly expressed their 
indifference to how they were being perceived by government officials or other organizations. They 
justified their continual actions—even if these actions diverged from formal coordination structures such 
as the shelter cluster—by discussing the ways that community members benefit from their services and 
efforts. We interpret this as challenging conventional notions of authority as a form of legitimacy granted 
by government officials, to an alternative (even ironic) and more situational form of authority that is 
perceived by the YPDR founders as more beneficial or valuable within this particular context. Despite 
lacking credibility among established relief organizations, YPDR found ways to appropriate other forms of 
legitimacy to justify their work (if only to themselves). Essentially they began to authorize their own work 
through the ways in which they made sense of various situations, even claiming that their lack of 
recognition among established NGOs actually enhanced their credibility among local officials and 
communities. 
YPDR was praised by officials in some LGUs while simultaneously being outcast by others. A project 
manager from the national Habitat for Humanity NGO explained that YPDR was not officially recognized 
by LGUs in the Santa Fe municipality. However, the mayor of this municipality regularly expressed 
confidence in YPDR’s work throughout the region—they were simultaneously authorized and de-
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authorized to work in this area, so they had to carefully navigate this domain to accomplish their projects. 
And this is a key challenge for relief work overall—constructing a form of legitimacy that provides 
authorization to take action within a given problem domain. 
Political disputes forced YPDR to conduct limited projects in the Santa Fe municipality, but the YPDR 
founders claimed that their relationships with key business people, the mayors, and others in the area 
allowed them to continue to construct houses across the Bantayan municipality. These relationships were 
often times conducted through private exchanges. In one such interaction we witnessed, the local mayor 
came to the YPDR director and said, “Don’t listen to the people who want to keep us apart. Come by 
my office later and let’s talk.” The same mayor described his appreciation of YPDR’s involvement due to 
their working with “the heart” and pushing through challenges. The confidence shown by this mayor 
authorized YPDR’s continued work in the region. At this time, the YPDR founders drew upon the mayor’s 
confidence in their work as evidence of their authority as a legitimate actor in the region. Although not 
every party involved saw them as authoritative, YPDR could invoke the statements of the mayor to justify 
their actions. 
As YPDR progressed to their second phase of construction, their building design had entirely changed to 
meet shelter cluster standards. In a surprising turn, YPDR had actually taken leadership of the shelter 
cluster meetings by this point to coordinate with other NGOs. In light of this the YPDR founder explained: 
It’s interesting because while we were building this all up we had enemies, you know, people were 
going after us. But now that we’ve kind of succeeded in that mission, we’ve gotten into that level 
wherein people, you know, we’ve got their attention. Now everyone wants to be friends. It’s 
really funny . . . And now with our new supporters out in Manila, we’re talking to the biggest 
people in the Philippines. . .We’re having meetings with the biggest corporations, we got 
sponsored by Globe [Globe Telecom; see http://www.globe.com.ph/] as one of their disaster 
response partners; things are now exciting. 
The change in how the founders made sense of their stature and authority as an organization is important 
to note here. As the organization became more established within this disaster relief context, they now 
explained their organization as legitimate in terms of their relationships with government officials, the 
shelter cluster, and other organizations—the very sources of authority they criticized in order to 
construct their authority on the basis of being an outsider. This further illustrates the relational nature of 
authority, something that is accomplished over time in practice with other key stakeholders—and 
sometimes quite ironically—not an objective feature of hierarchical or bureaucratic positioning. 
This example and brief tracing of YPDR’s explanations of how they understood their ability to act 
demonstrates a few key ideas about authority within this context. YPDR drew on different discursive 
resources (e.g., their reputation as a rogue startup NGO, the symbolism of their work practices, their 
connection with “the people,” and their antagonism towards the government and other NGOs) to explain 
and justify their ability to act within the region. Initially, they expressed their authority in terms of approval 
from beneficiaries of their services. What government officials and other NGOs thought of them did not 
matter (i.e., their de-authorization of YPDR) as long as the local people appreciated their work. Next, as 
they made changes to their practices and construction designs, they expressed their ability to act 
authoritatively in terms of government officials that supported their work. Finally, as they became well 
known within this area they explained their authority based upon their expertise and ability to work with 
others in “friendly” ways. The key thing to note here is how a single organization practiced and understood 
authority in different ways at different times with different people depending on their circumstances; 
authority was not simply an attribute they “had” and could impose indiscriminately, it was constructed 
communicatively. 
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Theme 2: Cluster Meetings, Coordination, and Authority 
At the same time YPDR was working to develop an authoritative frame best situated to their organization 
and the context surrounding them, the shelter cluster for the Cebu region was in continual operation to 
serve as a coordination base for NGOs working in the area. As one might expect, the grand hope of a 
shelter cluster as a place for separate organizations and agencies to learn from one another, partner, and 
receive directions from a shelter coordinator was not always realized in practice. Instead, observations of 
cluster meetings and discussions with participants demonstrates the ways that authority was jostled for 
within the region. More specifically, participants constructed new meanings of the shelter cluster that 
were then employed to authorize their activities. 
One of the intended purposes of the shelter cluster for Cebu was to ensure that organizations could avoid 
duplicating aid efforts, such as building multiple houses for a single beneficiary. The shelter cluster 
coordinator explained that duplication was a surprisingly common problem in disaster relief. Additionally, 
the shelter cluster in Cebu worked to provide standardized ways of constructing shelters. However, 
considering the volatility of NGOs working in the area, working as a member of a shelter cluster is not 
required to provide aid in a region. This was illustrated in our conversation with a leader of the Peace 
Project NGO (http://www.thepeaceproject.com/). After asking about how the Peace Project was 
coordinating with the shelter cluster to work in conjunction with other NGOs, the leader explained that, 
“we haven’t had any contact with them [the shelter cluster].” On paper then, the shelter cluster was 
providing standards for NGOs to follow for both quality assurance in construction and the avoidance of 
project duplication. Yet as we observed in practice, several NGOs actually had limited interactions with 
the shelter cluster. This fact was not lost on the shelter coordinator who commented on the shifting 
purpose of the shelter cluster by noting that, “other things happen. . . like basically it is a kind of living 
organism, the cluster not being just the shelter coordination team but you know like the collection of 
agencies working on shelter and the strength of each agency can vary a lot.” The official purpose and 
structure of the shelter cluster was not authoritative in practice, but as will be seen below, the shelter 
cluster became authoritative in a variety of ways as organizations drew upon the shelter cluster to 
authorize their actions within this problem domain. 
The shelter cluster in the Cebu region was not directly tied to the formal leadership of the cluster, but 
considered as a conglomerate of organizations and agencies. As a local leader of Red Cross explained, the 
shelter cluster meetings were at sometimes quarterly, monthly, or weekly intervals and were run by the 
coordinators (shelter cluster staff) for a period of time, in addition to YPDR and Islamic World Relief 
(IRW) taking periods of leadership as well. The leadership of the shelter cluster was not the important 
point as many organizational leaders discussed their actions in light of shelter cluster decisions. Leaders 
of IRW discussed the changes they made to structure design between different stages of building—or 
building in different sites—as being completed in line with cluster decisions and standards. IRW functioned 
as a leader of the shelter cluster for a period of time, but discussed their changes in terms of the cluster. 
The practice of explaining changes in strategy or design as dependent on the cluster was discussed by a 
variety of participants, but a leader of Habitat for Humanity made this point clearly: 
The shelter cluster has brought in other standards, standards for excellence for building. Especially 
now with the “build back better” concept, they’re required to ensure, to make sure the new 
constructions that we have will be resilient to not just the floods and strong winds but also 
earthquakes. 
Although a variety of organizations were responsible for crafting these standards, NGO leaders described 
the standards and their submission to these standards as belonging to the cluster. In fact, we observed 
that many NGOs chose to submit to the cluster standards for shelter construction, yet did not follow the 
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established Philippine standards. The shelter cluster could then be understood as authoritative as 
organizations submitted to building standards agreed upon within cluster meetings—a textual abstraction 
that enshrined cluster authority and thus authorized its legitimacy. 
In addition to the shelter cluster being used to authorize decisions, as different organizations constructed 
shelters other cluster members would periodically check the building structures that were completed and 
offer suggestions for what was to be changed. One of the starkest examples of this involved the local Red 
Cross. After building their first set of houses on Bantayan Island, several cluster members visited the 
construction sites and offered recommendations for changes in the future. An excerpt of our conversation 
with the local Red Cross leader is reproduced below: 
Interviewer: When did that visit by the shelter cluster happen? 
Red Cross: I think that was after August, mid-year of last year. A good number of shelter cluster 
members came here to observe the site and offered their own recommendations. 
Interviewer: So what were their recommendations? You said that there were others like the 
foundation that took time to approve but were applied, were there others? 
Red Cross: Yes, the positioning of the windows. Because initially the windows opened from the 
inside and they said it would be better if they opened from the outside to save space. 
Visits and recommendations from other cluster member organizations were not uncommon, but 
practices of authority that cluster members engage in were frequently contested by organizational 
constraints. 
Interviewer: So what were the recommendations that you weren’t able to include, you mentioned 
the bracing? 
Red Cross: Yes, we will include that one eventually. Because our original wall bracing is like this 
and the window is in between. They recommended it not to reach the window side so that in 
case the beneficiary decides to add an extension of the house, they would just have to open it and 
take the panel from the window. The original positioning of the wall bracing will hinder this. I 
don’t have my drawing though. I have here but this one’s the original design. . . . 
Interviewer: So those changes are still pending then? 
Red Cross: Yes, we’re waiting for the approval but we already have with us the technicalities on 
how to construct the changes. 
Interviewer: So how do you submit an approval; will the approval from the local staff here in 
Bantayan suffice or you need to hand it over to Manila? 
Red Cross: We have a technical engineer and a foreign delegate on the ground here, they’re the 
ones verifying and testifying for the changes. But Manila has the final say on decision making. 
Members of the shelter cluster were then able to provide recommendations from others and receive 
recommendations. However, this is not to say that any changes had to be made. As seen in this excerpt, 
the Red Cross claimed they could not make any changes until they had approved the changes with the 
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national Red Cross headquarters in Manila. Throughout our data several small NGOs discussed the 
challenges that they saw with large NGOs and the regular need for approval from national or international 
headquarters in order to act. As a founder of YPDR claimed, the cluster meetings often felt like all talk 
and no action. People could say that they would take care of one area, but then not act on it in part due 
to their institutional constraints. This highlights the central problem with authority in this collaborative 
disaster relief context. Different types of authority are contradictory and oppose one another; 
organizations might agree upon a plan of action, but this agreement that is seen as authoritative within the 
shelter cluster system was then trumped by the individual interests of organizations that did not accept it 
as authoritative. Authority is thus temporal and based in practices that can be continually altered. 
Additionally, the shelter cluster meetings were key sites for authority construction among the 
organizations and agencies involved. The shelter cluster meeting on July 31, 2014, provides a good example 
of this. Since there had not been a shelter cluster meeting for several months, this was an important 
gathering for the rebuilding efforts in Cebu province. This was an opportunity for shelter organizations 
and agencies to enhance their coordination, as well as update everyone on their projects and demonstrate 
their competency. The meeting took place at the Philippine Red Cross field office in the municipality of 
Bantayan. Attendees included Philippine Red Cross (PRC), Caritas Switzerland, Habitat for Humanity, 
Islamic Relief Worldwide (IRW), Young Pioneer Disaster Relief (YPDR), and Justice, Peace & Integrity of 
Creation-Integrated Development Center (JPIC). The majority of the meeting was devoted to each 
organization giving a 10-15-minute presentation on their work in Cebu. And as the newest member of the 
cluster, YPDR used this as an opportunity to assert their authority in face of skepticism about their work 
and credentials. Consider this excerpt from our fieldnotes: 
The foreign-based organizations had a noticeable presence in the meeting room, both in terms of 
attendance, as well as their vocality during the previous presentations. During their introduction, 
their representative pushed their qualifications, emphasizing their numerous partnerships with 
organizations, such as the International Labor Organization (ILO), and local governments, such as 
the Municipality of Bantayan. Further, they made a point to note that they were registered with 
the Philippine Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and were accredited by the Province of 
Cebu and Municipality of Bantayan. No other organization presenting during the meeting noted 
these details. Further, YPDR pointed to their emerging partnership with the University of San 
Carlos and close relationship with their skilled labor. 
After YDPR wrapped up their presentation, they attempted to intervene at multiple points in 
other presentations. Every other organization in attendance held questions until the end, but 
YDPR’s three staff frequently interjected. Following the first presentation by the Philippine Red 
Cross (PRC), a discussion started on best practices and recommendations. This quickly turned 
into a three-way conversation between PRC, YPDR, and the Shelter Cluster. The Shelter Cluster 
staff was the first to provide a comment, recommending the treatment of coconut lumber posts 
with anti-termite protection. YDPR was quick to counter this, stating that “local people know the 
lifespan of coconut lumber” and that “organizations should be selecting the hardest stuff.” In 
multiple subsequent comments, YDPR continued to passively suggest supplementary guidance that 
trailed recommendations provided by the Shelter Cluster and PRC. At other points later in the 
meeting, they offered up aspects of their approach as definitive answers to challenges encountered 
by other organizations. For example, they offered to certify skilled labor for Malteser[3] and 
provide qualified labor for Habitat for Humanity, which seemed to be an unwelcome intrusion 
into the work of other organizations. 
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Notice several things here. First, YPDR is actively constructing their authority by drawing upon discursive 
resources that could bolster their credibility among other cluster members. Evidence of these partnerships 
and approvals as a mechanism of legitimacy could also be found in textual sources released after the 
meeting. The partnership with the ILO and SEC registration were noted as two of the four leading bullets 
for YPDR’s presentation in the meeting minutes, thus textualizing these aspects of their authority and 
providing a resource to draw upon in future instances of authority construction. YPDR also foregrounded 
what they perceived as a key source of their expertise and authority—their connection to “the people” 
and their willingness to incorporate local knowledge (e.g. cocoanut lumber lifespan) into their planning 
and decision making. 
Finally, we observed how people simultaneously invoked and thwarted the authority of the shelter cluster 
to authorize their own work. Towards the beginning of this meeting the YPDR representative gave an 
update on one of their projects: “We’ve built 850 core shelters, each 7.5 m2 in size.” This was a clear 
violation of the shelter cluster’s minimum size standards. Yet we observed that they almost seemed to 
take pride in this violation, as if it indicated the superiority of their shelter designs, thus bolstering their 
authority as a more competent shelter provider. However, a bit later in the meeting the same YPDR 
representative noticeably gasped and laughed when another organization, JPIC, reported the cost 
information of their shelter projects: “Our costs come in at 135K (Philippine pesos) plus labor.” This too 
was higher than the shelter cluster standards and the YPRD representative was quick to point this out, 
while also indicating that their costs were within the standards. Here we have a situation where YPDR 
simultaneously thwarted the shelter cluster standards on size but also drew upon the standards for costs. 
YPDR took a similar approach when discussing the construction dimensions of their shelters. In their 
presentation they explained how they built (850) 7.5 square meter structures and (22) 18 square meter 
structures. They pointed to the speed of construction and factory-like production that was established. 
While the first of these structures were in direct conflict with the Shelter Cluster recommendation of 18 
square meters per household, they downplayed this detail by discussing the guidance provided by the 
Shelter Cluster staff in improving their designs. Notably, the Shelter Cluster had previously only verbally 
stated the explicit standard of 18 square meters per household, however this was published in final print 
by the Shelter Cluster on August 18th, approximately two weeks after this meeting in their Recovery Shelter 
Guidelines. This standard emerged from previous guidelines outlined in the Sphere Standards, which stated 
that shelter sizes should provide 3.5 square meters per individual. Despite the lower floor areas being 
provided, YPDR stated that they had the lowest cost shelter, and as a result, were delivering more 
assistance to families in need. This demonstrates that the shelter cluster and its standards were not 
authoritative per se, but rather discursive resources drawn upon as organizations and representatives 
constructed their own authority among other stakeholders. It also shows how the authority of the shelter 
cluster itself evolved as it incorporated revised standards that emerged from work in the field, and as 
people referenced these standards to explain and justify their actions. 
Overall, what this second theme demonstrates is the varied notions of authority that different NGOs 
constructed in order to act in connection with one another, and the varied ways they drew upon certain 
resources to construct this authority. As authority was practiced and made sense of in relation to the 
shelter cluster, the fragile and malleable nature of authority emerged as an important finding. More 
specifically, these examples show the disconnected or loosely coupled reality between the written purpose 
of the shelter cluster and how it was utilized on the ground. As some organizations are not involved or 
involved at a limited level, shelter cluster authority is contingent upon relationships between and within 
various organizations. However, organizations were able to act and therefore practice authority as they 
made changes and constructed shelters based upon shelter cluster decisions or standards. Organizational 
members that were engaged in cluster decision-making processes used the shelter cluster as a discursive 
resource to authorize and legitimate their actions. These decisions and standards were distanced from 
initial authors allowing individual organizations to act authoritatively and independently through the 
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guidance of the shelter cluster. Additionally, this theme demonstrates that the shelter cluster gained 
authority with each of the involved organizations through their regular interactions both within meetings 
and through individual discussions. The authority of the shelter cluster was not inherent in the system or 
UN affiliation, but rather was constructed (or resisted) among cluster members. Thus, the shelter cluster 
was only granted authority as members of the cluster made sense of their ability to act in relation to the 
shelter cluster itself. Lastly, the Red Cross excerpt showed how shelter cluster authority was thwarted 
as individual organizations were subject to various conflicting authoritative practices and processes. Next, 
our final theme shows how donors that provided funding for NGO projects were made present as 
authoritative figures within this problem domain. 
Theme 3: Donors, Authority, and Presentification 
Beyond showing how authority changes over time depending upon the discursive resources available to 
organizations, and the ability of organizations to draw upon the shelter cluster in practices of authority, 
the ways in which donors were authorized or deauthorized within this context adds to the overall case 
study. Disaster relief at the scale of Typhoon Yolanda requires enormous amounts of money to be donated 
by private citizens, governments, and corporations in order for NGOs to supply the services that they 
do. As thousands of shelters were constructed on Bantayan Island, donor support was regularly on the 
minds of NGO leaders and government officials. What is interesting about this part of the case study is 
that through observations and interviews it was evident that even though donors are rarely physically 
present at the physical sites of relief efforts, they were still “made present” as authoritative figures when 
NGO leaders explained their actions and ability to act. 
Most large-scale donors for NGOs working in disaster relief require quarterly or monthly reports that 
demonstrate the work that has been accomplished with their funding, but others are made more present 
within daily operations of NGOs. For instance, the local NGO Habitat for Humanity discussed ways they 
had to change their schedules to accommodate visiting donors’ desires to see current projects or work 
alongside local construction workers. The need to stop construction projects or shift plans demonstrates 
that the authority donors achieve with NGOs is bound up in the need for their funding. Donors also 
exhibited authority within the region through strict restrictions about what their money could be used 
for. In conversations with a variety of NGO leaders, it was apparent that organizations were constrained 
by the desires of the donors. Most donors (corporate or otherwise) even required NGOs to utilize their 
logos in the building of new shelters. Additionally, one NGO member explained: 
Donors, for some crazy reason, don’t fund entire solutions. So for example you say, this family 
lost everything, they don’t have a house also they don’t have a bathroom or a kitchen and maybe 
we should look into some livelihood things. And donors would say, “I want to sponsor house, or 
I want to do WASH activities [water, hygiene, and sanitation], or I want to sponsor children, etc.” 
This type of statement was common in disaster relief on Bantayan Island. Individual NGO projects were 
regularly influenced by the desires of donors. Donor authority was made present (presentified) in these 
situations as organizations explained their activities in terms of donor requirements and thereby exercised 
authority on behalf of the donors. 
In addition to requirements made by donors about how they would ensure that their money was going 
to a good cause, organizations often explained their own decisions and ability to act authoritatively due 
to what donors enabled or constrained. Some organizations might work primarily on constructing shelters 
because that is what their primary donors have funded them to do. For instance, members of the Peace 
Project explained that they were building a certain number of houses and a community center in a 
particular area in part because that was expected and planned by their donors. Additionally, a leader of 
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Malteser International explained that in light of many of their houses being built on government property 
they needed to: 
Ensure that the donor’s money is being used for something that is really good stewardship. . .So 
this is why we haven’t selected any from this one [community] because the issue is the donor 
wanted to emphasize that it helps us advocating that we don’t want them [beneficiaries] to stay 
in the danger zone forever. 
Here, the very choice of who would be given houses was made by the donor and executed by the NGO. 
In conversation the NGO brought up the donor and made the donor authoritative by presenting and 
consenting to their decisions. This type of discussion was common amongst NGO leaders beyond Malteser 
International. 
Considering the necessity of donors and funding to provide aid in disaster relief situations, people 
understandably would spend a fair amount of time concerning themselves with the wishes of donors. One 
of the key concerns expressed by organizational and governmental figures alike is ensuring that donor 
funds are used responsibly. Yet they were also cautious about how they responded to perceived misuse 
of funds. This point was made clear by the mayor of Bantayan municipality who explained: 
I think someone has to check them [NGOs] because for me I know what they are doing but I 
don’t want to talk about it because for me it is better that they are here, whatever they are doing 
but I pity their donors because it is a big misuse of funds, of donor’s money. So, sooner or later 
it has to be stopped because it is not helping anybody, it is not helping the donor, the purpose, it 
is not helping my town. And using my town as something as if they are working here which they 
are not and you will know when you are here you will know who they are but I do not want to 
tell you that. 
The mayor was discussing several organizations that seemed to be taking pictures of projects they were 
not working on in order to raise more funds. The tension that the mayor experienced about whether to 
stop NGOs or allow them to keep working was common and experienced by individual NGOs as well. In 
other words, was it better to submit to the authority of the donors or do the work that seems best fitted 
to the current needs of local communities? By articulating this struggle the mayor reauthorized the 
legitimacy of donors in this space, making them present as a matter of concern for the way in which funds 
were used. Also note the mayor’s lack of authority in this situation, despite his official position as a 
government official in this municipality—he does not approve of this organization’s actions, but he does 
not want to say anything for fear of them leaving the area. This situation further complicates our 
understanding of authority if we consider the conflicting ways in which donors are drawn upon. These 
organizations were submitting to the authority of their donors, taking pictures of work they knew donors 
would be pleased to see, and yet simultaneously thwarting donor authority by doing work donors would 
likely disapprove of. Consequently, authority is not an objective feature of donor organizations, but rather 
something people employ in order to legitimate their actions, while also defying this same authority as a 
way to establish one’s own capacity as a competent actor. The key issue here is how donors are made 
present (or absent) in order to justify actions and legitimate various relief organizations. 
A final way in which donors were made present in this relief work involved the development of 
the Recovery Guidelines created by the shelter cluster. This document presents a “range of shelter options 
outlining their core principles and parameters” that were supposed to be considered in the recovery 
phase. The relevant issue here is that many of these guidelines were developed with donors in mind so 
they could better understand the rebuilding work happening in the Philippines. As one shelter cluster 
member explained: 
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I think people are really confused and they can’t really see the difference between core and 
progressive [structures] and they don’t really, they aren’t so mindful of it either because they have 
already done their proposal, the donors have already funded X temporary core shelters and that 
is what they are doing so but now there is a new reporting system and it reflects the recovery 
guidelines. 
The issue here was that donors tend to only fund certain kinds of work, so guidelines were adapted to 
both clarify the nature of this work to various donors, and to ensure that shelter work adhered to the 
preferences of donors. In this way donors were “lurking” in the background of these guidelines as an 
authoritative presence that shaped how the rebuilding work was implemented on the ground, and 
subsequently authorizing NGOs to build using the shelter archetypes outlined in the guidelines. 
The examples of donors as authoritative within disaster relief work demonstrates the ways that donors 
are made present and able to act authoritatively. The mayor’s concern demonstrated that some 
organizations were perceived as more or less authoritative depending on how they appear to spend money 
donated to them. This is consistent with YPDR’s thinking mentioned above about their own authority and 
desirability by the local people considering their frugal and minimalist approach to disaster work. 
Furthermore, this example demonstrates that practices of authority can be both achieved by organizations 
and through organizations by other actors such as donors. As NGO leaders make donors present in 
disaster relief situations by justifying their actions in the name of their donors, donors act authoritatively 
on the NGO and through the NGO to act within the region. This finding further complicates the 
intersecting and overlapping forms of authority demonstrated throughout the previous two findings. 
To summarize, our analysis demonstrates that authority is indeed an important matter of concern for 
disaster relief coordination, as the authority to act individually and collaboratively is always a negotiated 
and contested. Individual organizations draw on available discursive resources as they make sense of their 
authority and actions. However, the ways in which an individual organization practices authority is bound 
up in a web of other authoritative practices such as the shelter cluster, LGU involvement, or donor 
requirements. With this in mind, it is evident that organizations do not have authority within this problem 
domain, but instead construct authority to accomplish a variety of individual and collective goals. At times 
an organization might draw on discursive resources to thwart the authority of local government officials 
or the shelter cluster in order to act in accordance with the authority of donors; while at other times an 
organization might draw upon the same shelter cluster as a discursive resource to describe and define 
their ability to act in particular ways. Thus, these findings suggest that authority is in a constant state of 
negotiation as various organizations coordinate with each other to provide effective disaster relief. 
 
Discussion 
The purpose of our study was to explore the social construction of authority in disaster relief 
coordination. We wanted to learn more about how stakeholders drew upon various discursive resources 
in order to establish or preserve their authority to act within a certain problem domain, and we wanted 
to know how people made sense of authority in the complex environment of humanitarian aid work. We 
assembled literature on authority, coordination, communication, practice theory, and sensemaking to 
develop a theoretical framework that would inform our empirical investigation. We examined the case of 
humanitarian coordination in the Cebu province of the Philippines following Typhoon Yolanda. Examples 
from this case study help to illustrate ideas from our theoretical framework, while also highlighting new 
problems and questions to motivate future research. Consequently, our research has important 
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implications—both practical and scholarly—for how we understand authority and coordination in the 
context of disaster relief. 
First, our study into construction of authority in disaster relief provides several insights which are useful 
to improve future response efforts. Newly established and small non-governmental organizations were 
faced with significant barriers that stemmed from the humanitarian clusters. For these young and small 
organizations, the process of authorizing meant that a large number of resources had to be allocated and 
employed in order to gain legitimacy. It is imperative that these organizations are included in ongoing 
debates to reform the humanitarian cluster system as coordination mechanisms continue to evolve. 
Reducing the demand on organizations through information and communication technologies (ICTs), 
cross-sectoral planning, and alternative modalities could allow for more efficient use of staffing time and 
resources. 
Additionally, our findings show that authority construction is fundamentally relational. High staff turnover 
rates and cluster documentation are likely contributors to more rapid distanciation of authority. The short 
term presence of staff has the potential to reinforce flawed strategies as authoritative and revisiting 
standards of practice regularly is critical in rapidly evolving responses.  Organizations should ensure that 
sufficient resources are available for staff transitions and consider earlier integration of local staff into 
programs to ease authoritative changes. Lastly, our findings show that there is a need to revisit donor 
funding mechanisms. Our work demonstrates that single sector programming intended to provide 
accountability to donors does so at the expense of accountability of beneficiaries. The nature of donor–
aid organization relations have established norms that result in a divide between perceived and actual 
needs of affected populations. More flexible funding could reposition authority in responses and allow for 
local populations to have more control over decision-making and distribution of resources. 
Furthermore, our study complements and extends previous research in several important ways. Existing 
communication research on risk, crisis, emergencies, and disasters focuses on issues related to media 
coverage (e.g., Houston, Pfefferbaum, & Rosenholtz, 2012), health campaigns and messaging (e.g., Adame 
& Miller, 2015), information sharing and reporting (e.g., Liu, Fraustino, & Jin, 2015; Sommerfeldt, 2015), 
social media (e.g., Gurman & Ellenberger, 2015), networks, interorganizational relationships, and social 
capital (e.g., Doerfel, Chewning, & Lai, 2013; Doerfel, Lai, & Chewning, 2010), or political rhetoric 
(e.g., Griffin-Padgett & Allison, 2010). Yet previous research has devoted less attention to communication 
among people and organizations as they respond to disasters and make sense of these emergent situations. 
Our work helps push the literature in this direction, showing both the utility of communicative 
explanations and the distinct contributions communication scholarship can make to our understanding of 
important social phenomena. 
Additionally, our study expands the communication literature on authority and agency to the important 
contexts of humanitarian collaboration and coordination, a distinct setting that challenges common 
understandings of organizing and authorization. Most importantly, the collaborative work of disaster 
coordination lacks a focal organization from which claims to authority are made and justified. To date the 
communication scholarship on authority presumes a source of authority that is generally recognized 
among organizational members, even as they work out this authority in practice. For example, Cooren, 
Brummans, and Charrieras’ (2008) study of Médecins Sans Frontières’ (Doctors Without Borders) work 
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo details how different people attempt to establish their authority 
and exercise power in order to make the organization present in a variety of situations. Although they vie 
to represent and speak for the organization in different ways, there is no dispute that Médecins Sans 
Frontières is the reference point for these negotiations. Often this is not the case for more collaborative 
humanitarian efforts, where people need to co-construct sources of authority that are collectively 
recognized because appeals to central organizations are less effective. Collaboration does not happen “in” 
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an organization, and often there is not a default organizational authority to mediate among competing 
interests and interpretation. Therefore, an important next step for communication research on authority 
and agency is extending to the context of interorganizational collaboration and coordination, a 
contribution that our study provides. 
Finally, our research helps move the scholarly conversation on these issues away from static notions of 
authority and communication towards more complex, communicative understandings that better reflect 
the actual work of disaster relief coordination. In theory, disaster relief is a highly coordinated effort 
orchestrated by a central agency that has the authority to manage activities and align multiple interests. 
However, in practice coordination is messy and authority is problematic, and it is this notion of “in 
practice” that is a key concern in this study—both in terms of local interactions that constitute these 
practices and the retrospective sensemaking that provides meaning. Our research further demonstrates 
how authority is a process, a property of relationships (Taylor & Van Every, 2014), not a commodity or 
stable attribute. Authority is both emergent and contingent, and it shifts in the very communication 
intended to define and exercise it. The work of disaster relief coordination calls for a shift in understanding 
authority from that of principle to that of construction—this study represents an important step in that 
direction. 
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[2] All organization names are real, but no individual names are used in order to ensure confidentiality. 
[3] Malteser International is the worldwide humanitarian relief agency of the Sovereign Order of Malta (which is a lay 
religious order of the Catholic Church). 
 
